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European Union insolvencies: the critical
elements in formulating a scheme
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Abstract
Only the harmonisation of  laws is seen as being able to solve legal uncertainty resulting from legal diversity,
but, notwithstanding the advent of  the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, thus far there is no real
harmonisation of  insolvency laws in the EU. There are indications that the European Commission (EC)
has been considering the formulation of  a scheme for the harmonisation of  the rules that apply in insolvency
proceedings to permit the avoidance of  transactions entered into prior to the commencement of  insolvency
proceedings. On this basis this article identifies and analyses those factors that will need to be considered and
addressed in the formulation of  any harmonised scheme, as well as ascertaining the problems that these
factors may cause in the construction of  such a scheme. This is a critical issue, for it is all well and good to
say that there should be harmonisation, but how that is done, what must be taken into account and what is
included in any harmonised scheme is another matter and requires careful thought and consultation. 
Keywords: avoidance rules; harmonisation; insolvency proceedings; European Union
1 Introduction
Harmonisation in law refers to efforts to change the laws of  two or more countries tobe more substantively similar to each other.1 The UN Committee on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has defined harmonisation as: ‘the process through which
domestic laws may be modified to enhance predictability in cross-border commercial
transactions’.2 In the European Union (EU) context harmonisation has been seen as an
instrument that is complementary to the general articles in the Treaty of  Rome (the Treaty)
when free movement of  capital, goods, persons and services has not been achieved.3
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Harmonisation should be employed to realise market integration.4 Only the harmonisation
of  laws is seen as being able to solve legal uncertainty resulting from legal diversity.5 It is
provided for in Article 3(h) of  the Treaty as one of  the mechanisms that is to be used in
order to attain the aims of  the Treaty,6 so that it will be employed as a device to the degree
that it is necessary for the appropriate functioning of  the Common Market. It is deemed
necessary because of  economic pressures in the EU relating to the Common Market and
facilitation of  trade.7 Attempts to harmonise civil law in earnest can be traced back to the
late 1980s,8 when harmonisation was employed in addressing several private law matters in
the Single European Act (in 1987).9
Thus far harmonisation in insolvency law has only occurred to a very limited extent.
Harmonisation commenced with the enactment of  the European Regulation on
Insolvency Proceedings (the Regulation) which became law across the EU, with the
exception of  Denmark, on 31 May 2002. It was felt that the Regulation was needed
because national legal systems could not achieve the proper functioning of  the internal
market.10 The goal of  the Regulation was to provide for a universalist insolvency
model,11 founded on one law applying to an insolvency proceeding, and for that law to
apply to all matters that related to that proceeding across the breadth of  the EU. This
was designed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of  insolvency proceedings
having cross-border effects.12 Recital 4 of  the Regulation13 provided that it was
necessary to enable the proper functioning of  the EU’s internal market to prevent
people having incentives to transfer assets or judicial proceedings between member
states and thereby obtaining a more favourable legal position. The Regulation’s objective
was to produce a marked reduction in costs incurred in the administration of  any
insolvency. The Regulation provided clear guidelines that ensured stability and
consistency in relation to areas of  jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and
enforcement of  judgments.14 The Regulation has been reviewed and on 26 June 2017 a
recast version of  the Regulation (EIR) came into force. The EIR very much follows in
the tradition of  the original Regulation. References to recitals and articles in the EIR in
this article are to this later version.
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While the EIR goes some way towards harmonising the private international law rules
as far as insolvency proceedings are concerned in the member states of  the EU,15 it clearly
did not purport to seek to harmonise substantive insolvency law, save in a very limited
way. The EIR ensures that decisions on cross-border insolvencies are recognised across
the EU and designates both the courts that will have the power to open insolvency
proceedings and what law will be applied to the insolvency proceedings. 
During the first decade of  this century the issue of  insolvency law harmonisation was
avoided,16 yet in more recent times the possibility of  harmonisation of  substantive
insolvency law or, at least, elements of  it has been seriously considered. In 2010,
following a request from the European Parliament, INSOL Europe17 prepared a report
which examined the need for and the feasibility of  harmonisation of  European
insolvency law. The report concluded that several topics were apt for harmonisation and
that harmonisation in relation to these topics was desirable and achievable.18 One of
these topics dealt with the avoidance rules applied to insolvencies. Such rules enable
transactions or elements of  transactions made prior to a debtor entering insolvency
proceedings to be avoided (antecedent transactions). These actions are brought, usually,
by a person appointed to administer the insolvent estate of  a debtor against a third party
who has benefited from a transaction entered into with the debtor prior to the opening
of  insolvency proceedings in relation to the debtor seeking the avoidance of  the
transaction.19 This may then lead to the augmentation of  the assets comprised in the
insolvent estate and, hence, a greater payment to the general creditors of  the debtor.
The publication of  the INSOL Europe report precipitated one commentator to state
that: ‘Insolvency Law has finally become a field of  law for which harmonisation at a
European level is considered both important and feasible.’20 This can be linked to the fact
that the reform of  insolvency law is very much near the top of  the EU’s policy agenda.
It is an important element of  the EU’s Capital Markets Union project, and the Five
Presidents’ Report: Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union on 22 June 201521 lists the
area of  insolvency law among the most important bottlenecks preventing the integration
of  capital markets.22 Recently the European Central Bank called for the harmonisation of
avoidance actions.23
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Following the abovementioned INSOL Europe report, the European Parliament in a
Resolution of  15 November 201124 said in recitals that there are certain areas of
insolvency law where harmonisation is worthwhile and achievable. The Parliament stated
that the lack of  harmonisation inhibits predictability of  the results of  court
proceedings.25 Also a report by the Association for Financial Markets in Europe in
February 2016 concluded that convergence of  insolvency law and practice provides for
significant benefits.26 The European Parliament said that even if  the creation of  a body
of  substantive insolvency law at EU level is not possible, there are certain areas of
insolvency law where harmonisation is worthwhile and achievable.27 One of  those areas
that INSOL Europe and the Parliament felt was ready for harmonisation was the
avoidance rules. But, the INSOL report did not endeavour to provide any possible rules
that might be applied as far as harmonisation was concerned. 
While not mentioned in the INSOL report, another more recent report, which
involved a study into substantive insolvency law in the EU,28 has found that there are
many divergences in the avoidance rules applying across the EU and the provisions of  the
EIR do not alleviate those or provide a fair resolution of  avoidance issues.29
There are various shades of  harmonisation, but it would seem that what is being
envisaged as far as the avoidance rules are concerned is total harmonisation (or
exhaustive, hard, maximum or strong harmonisation as it is variously referred to). This is
when no lack of  adherence to rules is permitted save where safeguard measures are
needed.30 The topic of  this paper is considered in the context of  total harmonisation.
Where there is total harmonisation, rules will apply across the EU in all insolvencies.
There are indications that this approach might be favoured by the EC, but, having said
that, it would not appear to be a straightforward answer to the problem when one
considers what the provisions of  the law will actually be. There are obstacles that would
have to be overcome. Any consideration of  a harmonisation process in insolvency, where
a multitude of  jurisdictions is involved, must involve careful thought being given to how
the harmonisation will affect and relate to other issues, both involving insolvency and
non-insolvency areas of  law.31 Certainly, achieving harmonisation will not be an easy task.
There will be some hard decisions that the EC will have to make. 
The aim of  this paper is to identify and analyse those primary matters that are
contained in the legislative regimes of  member states and that need to be considered and
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addressed in the formulation of  any harmonised scheme, as well as to ascertain the
problems that these matters may cause in the construction of  a legislative scheme. There
may be other matters that lie outside the regimes of  member states at the moment that
need to be considered, but due to constraints of  space that issue will not be broached
here. The subject of  the paper is a critical issue, for it is all well and good to say that there
should be harmonisation, but how that is done and what is included in any harmonised
scheme is another matter. Clearly, it is not going to be an easy task to draft provisions
which provide a system that is fair, effective, workable and respected in all parts of  the
EU, as the avoidance rules that exist in most member states have developed over many
years and have done so in order to address particular concerns and issues that have arisen.
Nor is it within the scope of  the paper to consider the benefits and drawbacks of
harmonisation or to specify how avoidance rules should be formulated.32 Rather, on the
basis that harmonisation were to occur, the paper proceeds to examine what has to be
taken into account as far as the technical aspects of  avoidance rules are concerned, and
with reference to what is the existing position in the various member states.33 It must be
added that this article does not seek to provide a template for harmonised rules, let alone
suggest what a scheme might look like and how it would operate. The paper is situated
further back than that in the development of  a scheme. It aims to analyse the primary
issues that need to be considered in the formulation of  rules and to make a case for
certain approaches. Because of  the number of  factors that warrant consideration and
publishing limits, it is not possible to analyse them individually in as much depth as they
deserve. This is something that will have to be done at the point of  formulating a
harmonised avoidance regime. While giving appropriate examples of  avoidance rules
applying across the EU, the paper does not seek to discuss the avoidance rules applying
in member states in any detail. The recent report for the EC encompassing a study into
substantive insolvency law in the EU does that to a degree.34
The article is structured as follows. First, it explains the nature of  avoidance rules and
the policy that appears to underpin them. Second, it discusses the kinds of  antecedent
transactions that are often subject to avoidance rules. In the third and principal part of
the article, there is an analysis of  the main factors that seemingly need to be considered
either before the drafting of  a scheme commences or in the process of  drafting such a
scheme, with these factors being based on the avoidance rules that presently exist around
the EU. Finally, there are some concluding remarks.
For ease of  exposition and because more transactional avoidance tends to occur in
corporate insolvencies, I will assume that the debtor is a company, but there will be need,
of  course, for avoidance rules to apply to individual debtors. Whether they are broadly
the same or different is something that will have to be considered. The article refers to
the person who initiates avoidance actions as the claimant, and the person or entity
against whom action is taken is referred to generally as the defendant or the beneficiary
of  a transaction. The claimant will, most often, be the person who has been appointed to
administer the debtor’s affairs pursuant to insolvency proceedings. For the purposes of
this article this person will be referred to as an insolvency practitioner, which is the term
used in the recast version of  the EIR.35
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2 Avoidance rules
Historically, avoidance rules go back to Roman times where there were up to four legal
processes that could be used to recover property for the estate of  a debtor from other
parties, with the most well-known action being the actio pauliana.36 The main features of
this action have survived to the present day.37 Over the years European jurisdictions
developed their rules on avoidance in different ways and these rules include divergent
elements and place emphasis on multifarious approaches, as we see later in the article.
This is due to many factors, not least being the sources of  law of  a country, its history,
culture and the kind of  legal system that was fostered. Nevertheless, we find today that,
while legal systems in the various jurisdictions of  the EU differ, the solutions which these
systems provide for in relation to antecedent transactions involving the loss of  assets of
insolvents have many commonalities,38 which does assist, to some degree, in formulating
a harmonised regime.
One of  the primary duties of  an insolvency practitioner appointed to administer many
types of  insolvency regimes, and liquidation in particular, is to investigate the affairs of
the insolvent that is subject to the relevant insolvency proceedings. An important aspect
of  this is to determine if  there were any transactions entered into by the insolvent before
the advent of  insolvency proceedings to see if  any of  them are suspect and can be
attacked because they are detrimental to creditors. Avoidance rules obviously are
retrospective in effect and permit the setting-aside of  transactions that were, at the time
they were entered into, generally, valid and not vulnerable to challenge under the general
law of  the relevant jurisdiction. 
No standard theory has really developed in Europe as to the reason for the existence
of  avoidance provisions, but there are clear policies that underpin them. First, the
property of  an insolvent is to be distributed fairly and rateably among its creditors,39
subject to provisions contained in the statutory scheme.40 Avoidance actions might be
seen as promoting collectivism and fairness among creditors, and the underlying purpose
of  avoidance provisions is usually seen as being to ensure that there is fairness.41
Nevertheless, fairness does not translate into absolute equality between creditors as
legislation in all member states includes provisions embedding the right of  priority to
certain groups of  creditors. A prime example is employees of  the insolvent who are
usually granted some form of  priority in all member states. 
Avoidance rules are enacted so as to protect the general body of  creditors from the
unfair diminution of  the insolvent’s assets which can be a consequence of  a debtor
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giving an advantage to someone at some point before the opening of  insolvency
proceedings, and, therefore, there is a distortion in the distribution of  the property of
the insolvent according to the statutory scheme. Allowing for avoidance is aimed at
preventing the unjustified enrichment of  one individual to the detriment of  all creditors.
The provisions seek to address two possible situations. First, insolvents may transfer
some of  their assets, prior to entry into insolvency proceedings, at below market value,
or purchase assets at above market value, in order to benefit some third party, often an
associate or connected party; this is action that might be characterised as debtor
misbehaviour.42 Second, a debtor may discriminate in the payment of  creditors and
satisfy one creditor while ignoring others, which ends up being detrimental to the general
body of  creditors.43 These situations often involve the debtor benefiting people who are
associated with the debtor. Where a debtor benefits a creditor who is not associated with
the debtor, it often is the consequence of  pressure brought to bear by the creditor when
the creditor becomes aware of  the fact that the debtor is in financial distress and might
in fact be insolvent.
A second policy, which arguably has only risen to prominence in the past 25 years, is
that avoidance provisions exist in order to stop the dismemberment of  the insolvent’s
estate,44 which is something that can happen when an insolvent enters into transactions
prior to insolvency proceedings being opened. The concern is that a reduction of  funds
and assets might seriously reduce the chances of  the insolvent being able to continue to
carry on business effectively or at all, and reduces the possibility of  the insolvent being
able to be restructured.45 Rules providing for the avoidance of  certain antecedent
transactions can, arguably, be a factor in protecting the insolvent’s estate and, ultimately,
the creditors as a general body, as well as exacerbating the debtor’s insolvency problems.46
It would seem that this policy has become of  greater importance in recent years as the
restructuring of  companies has been increasingly regarded as a critical issue in many
nations within the EU and is something on which the EC has itself  placed emphasis.47
Nevertheless, the existence of  avoidance rules is unlikely to prevent dismemberment for
the most part as they only apply ex post and creditors, in particular, are likely to put in train
processes that will enable them to get paid when a debtor is insolvent or nearing
insolvency and then hope that a subsequently appointed insolvency practitioner will
decide not to take legal proceedings in order to avoid relevant transactions. On many
occasions creditors, for instance, will not know whether a company will be able to be
restructured successfully, so they are likely to grab what they can when they can. Unless
the continuation of  the business of  the insolvent is likely to benefit them in some
substantial way, such as the fact that the company is a critical customer, creditors may be
unconcerned that their receipt of  full or partial payment might contribute to the eventual
demise of  the debtor.
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A third policy might underlie the avoidance rules. That is, they are designed to deter
parties from entering into transactions with insolvents that could be avoided. If  such a
policy exists, it is highly questionable as to whether it works, given the present state of
avoidance rules around the EU and the fact that many parties will take the benefit of  such
transactions because the company might be saved from entering insolvency proceedings,
and, even if  it does enter such proceedings, the insolvency practitioner might take the
decision not to commence avoidance provisions for any one of  a number of  reasons,
such as lack of  funding or evidence. Those benefiting from a transaction with an
insolvent might reason that, even if  avoidance proceedings are commenced, there might
be a deal to be done that will settle the proceedings. Also, even if  an avoidance action is
pursued and is successful, there will be no penalty imposed on the defendant other than
the fact that the benefit of  the transaction is lost. Moreover, if  a creditor is ordered to
return a benefit that is regarded as a preference, the creditor is not prohibited from
claiming in the insolvent estate for what is owed. The upshot is that there is little reason
why a party would not enter into a transaction if  a benefit could be obtained.
The successful end result of  a transactional avoidance action will be an enhancement
of  the corpus of  property that is available to the creditors as a whole, and, it is hoped, it
will provide a better dividend for creditors.
Important issues in relation to avoidance are predictability and certainty, and these are
two factors that might lead to a decision to harmonise avoidance rules. All parties,
whether it be a creditor providing credit in the sale of  goods, a bank lending money or
the insolvency practitioner in insolvency proceedings, need to know the effect of  entering
into transactions and when there can be interference in the normal processes of
commerce.
3 Antecedent transactions
The regimes that member states provide for the avoidance of  transactions differ in
structure.48 For example, some regimes consist of  only one broad rule, such as
transactions that cause detriment to the creditors are to be set aside, whereas other
regimes are much longer and provide greater detail. Although some transactions entered
into in the time prior to the advent of  insolvency proceedings are generally set aside in a
vast majority of  member states, and notwithstanding that it has been said that national
legal systems do not fundamentally differ with regard to the categories of  contestable
transactions,49 the laws around the EU do provide for the avoidance of  various and
different types of  transactions. It is not possible in this article to identify and discuss the
different transactions that are detrimental to creditors. As legal systems often group
different types of  transactions into categories,50 we will focus on the categories. The
reason for doing so is that it is highly likely that member states will not accept a
harmonised system that does not provide for the avoidance of  these categories, and so,
for the purposes of  this paper, it is conceded that these categories will have to be
addressed by a harmonised scheme. The two most prevalent of  the categories are, first,
transactions that constitute preferences and benefit one or more creditors in relation to
the general body of  creditors, and, second, transactions which have the effect that the
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insolvent loses out and hence so do the insolvent’s creditors in subsequent insolvency
proceedings because some third party has benefited from, or as a result of, transactions.51 
The recent report undertaken for the EC on substantive insolvency law in the EU
determined that all EU member states include in their avoidance rules some kind of
preference provision, with many similarities between the rules in various states.52
Preferences involve the debtor (who subsequently enters insolvency proceedings) giving
some benefit, perhaps payment of  a debt owed or the creation of  security in favour of
one of  the debtor’s existing creditors, and this is to the detriment of  the other creditors
who do not get paid or receive any security in relation to the debts owed to them. The
creditors suffer detriment in that priority creditors such as employees may not get paid
what they are owed, and/or non-priority creditors, who will have to share pari passu with
one another,53 will receive nothing or less from what is left in the insolvent’s estate
because a transaction was entered into. In several member states special rules apply to
payments that are made before the date that payment is due or where payment is made in
an irregular manner.54 The beneficiaries of  such payments are seen as being less worthy
of  protection and the payment more reprehensible. In other states no distinction is made
between payments that are due and owing and those that are not.55 Any consideration of
a harmonised regime will have to decide whether to make any distinction between those
transactions involving payments made when they were due to be paid by the debtor and
those transactions that involved payments being made before the debt was due or were
made in an irregular manner.
A second category of  transaction is the transaction at an undervalue. This involves a
debtor providing some benefit to a third party, usually someone associated with the
debtor, that enriches the third party to the detriment of  the debtor and eventually, if  the
debtor enters insolvency proceedings, the debtor’s creditors. An example would be where
a company sells an asset valued at €100,000 to the spouse of  one of  the company’s
directors for €50,000. In this example the debtor’s estate has lost €50,000. A gift of  its
property by a debtor is another clear example of  a transaction at an undervalue.56 The
abovementioned EC-commissioned study on substantive insolvency found that all
member states, except for Cyprus, have some form of  transaction at an undervalue
avoidance rule.57
All but nine member states have some avoidance rule(s) that applies where debtors
have sought to put their assets beyond the reach of  their creditors.58 This is sometimes
known as a transaction intended to defraud creditors and sometimes as a fraudulent
conveyance.59 With these kinds of  rules for avoidance, either or both the debtor and the
recipient of  the benefit of  the transaction must be proved to have intended to defraud
creditors of  the debtor. These kinds of  transactions can be placed in the second category
as the relevant transaction involves the debtor not receiving the amount of  value that it
should from the transaction.
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A significant number of  member states, with only five exceptions, include some kind
of  avoidance rule that invalidates the provision of  security in favour of  a hitherto
unsecured creditor.60 For example, X, an unsecured creditor of  Y Ltd who is owed a
substantial amount, agrees to refrain from taking legal proceedings against Y Ltd if  the
company agrees to give X security for the existing credit. This involves both X’s debt
being converted from being unsecured to secured, and it leaves the company in no better
position financially than it was before granting the security. More importantly, creditors
of  Y Ltd will, if  the company enters insolvency proceedings, be worse off, as the creditor
who is now secured will get more from the estate of  Y Ltd than the unsecured creditors.
Two instances of  the invalidation of  transactions providing security bear a mention. First,
in the UK floating charges may be invalidated when they are granted by companies that
are on their last legs61 and the creation of  which will be to the detriment of  the unsecured
creditors. Second, in Germany62 any security that is created by a debtor within the three
months before an insolvency filing and at a time when the debtor is in a position of
illiquidity can be avoided if, at the time of  the granting of  security, the creditor who
became secured as a result of  the creation of  the security knew of  the illiquidity.63 The
voiding of  security is really allied to preferences as the general thrust behind the former
is to prevent a creditor gaining a preference over other creditors by taking security which
will give it, in most states, priority over other creditors. Security and secured interests are
treated differently across the EU,64 and this can lead to problems where an insolvent’s
property is subject to security that was created in a different member state of  the EU to
the one in which insolvency proceedings have been opened under the EIR.65 This is
exacerbated by the fact that there is no exhaustive definition of  security (rights in rem) in
the EIR.66
How the rules are drafted and whether the avoidance of  other types of  transactions
should be catered for is a matter for a detailed study of  the policy behind avoidance, the
existing rules in member states and the breadth of  such rules. The latter two issues will
involve some consideration of  important issues that hitherto have been taken into
account in the formulation of  existing national legislation.
4 Critical factors in a harmonised scheme
If  harmonisation is to be implemented, there are a number of  factors that have to be
examined. In some cases it is inevitable that there will have to be a resolution of  issues,
precipitated by divergence of  approach in relation to how these factors found in the
legislation of  member states are addressed, if  at all. One cannot put a gloss on the fact
that in some areas there are almost opposing positions taken by different states. The
existence of  some of  the elements making up an avoidance rule can be a highly
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controversial matter.67 One reason that the rules that apply in each state can be so
important is that they will affect how the assets of  debtors will be distributed and they
‘reflect the different policy goals pursued by governments and policy makers’.68
Before formulating the rules for avoidance it is necessary for there to be an
articulation of  the objectives of  the inclusion of  such rules in insolvency legislation as the
objectives will determine what the rules should be. Consensus has to be reached on the
fundamental principles that should be implemented in the laying down of  avoidance
rules. This is important for coherence. The rules must be consistent internally, and they
must be consistent with one another. 
It has been said that, besides coherence, the following principles must be considered:
clarity and precision; thrift;69 comprehensiveness;70 and the optimal realisation of  legal
values.71 After coherence, it has been suggested that the most important principle to be
considered in the construction of  a legislative scheme is the optimal realisation of  (legal)
values, because ‘a system of  law that leads to the reasonable weighing of  values can be
considered to be well organised’.72
What is clearly to be at the heart of  any scheme is that a transaction will only be able
to be impugned successfully if  it does in fact cause a detriment to the creditors as a whole.
This must be the basis behind avoidance, and so, if  a transaction occurs on the eve of  a
company’s liquidation because of  insolvency but involves the debtor receiving fair value
from another for what it has purchased or sold, there is no ground for avoidance as
neither the debtor company nor its creditors have suffered a loss.
Now we turn to consider some of  the most significant issues that are included in
avoidance rules around the EU and which will probably have to be considered in any
harmonisation process. The factors identified have been gleaned from the legislation of
member states and the recent report prepared for the EC on substantive insolvency law
in the EU,73 with some consideration of  the academic and practitioner literature.
4.1 ESTABLISHING INSOLVENCY
While it might be expressed in different words, the vast majority of  EU jurisdictions
provide that transactions can only be set aside if  the debtor was insolvent at the time of
the making of  the transactions sought to be avoided.74 The pervasive use of  an
insolvency condition for avoidance satisfies the need to consider it here, given the
approach articulated at the beginning of  this part of  the article. Nevertheless, there are
good reasons why it should be a condition. For instance, arguably, transactions should not
be able to be challenged prior to insolvency as it is only at that point that the company is
clearly in financial trouble and it is likely that those dealing with it would only have
become aware of  these troubles when insolvency can be established.
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For a harmonised scheme, it would be necessary to establish a definition of
insolvency, for a failure to do so would mean that the kind of  certainty that parties crave
would not be achieved. Notwithstanding the different terminology used in member states,
there is closeness of  approach in relation to this factor. For instance, Germany, Austria,
Croatia and Bulgaria refer to a debtor being illiquid or over-indebted and in a number of
states, including Belgium75 and Luxembourg,76 avoidance can only occur where the
transaction was entered into when the company ceased paying debts or had suspended
payments. Being illiquid in Germany involves a debtor being unable to meet its mature
obligations to pay77 and accords with the concept of  cash-flow insolvency which is used
in the UK and Ireland. The concept of  the cessation of  the payment of  debts also
accords with cash-flow insolvency. The explanation of  insolvency in some member states
is more precise. In Slovakia, for example, insolvency means that a debtor is unable to pay
at least two debt obligations to more than one creditor after they have been due for 30
days.78 But, then again, in some other member states insolvency is not as precise. For
instance, in the Italian legislation it is said that insolvency occurs with the failure to fulfil
obligations or by other external factors that demonstrate the debtor’s inability to regularly
satisfy its obligations.79
The UK law provides that avoidance rules only apply where the debtor was unable to
pay its debts at the time of  the impugned transaction, and this can mean a number of
things, but primarily it means that the debtor cannot pay its debts as they fall due (cash-
flow insolvency), or the debtor’s liabilities are greater than its assets (balance-sheet
insolvency).80 Over-indebtedness in Germany means that the debtor’s assets no longer
cover existing obligations to pay81 and is consistent with the concept of  balance-sheet
insolvency that applies in the UK and Ireland.82 It is likely that a statement about inability
to pay debts in a harmonised regime would not be able to be extensive, and it will rely
upon subsequent case law to determine the finer points of  the meaning of  insolvency.
This does leave open the possibility for divergence, but it would be a matter for the Court
of  Justice of  the European Union (CJEU) to ensure that the case law develops
consistently as it has in other matters that have been difficult elements of  the EIR.83
4.2 SUBJECTIVE V OBJECTIVE
One important matter that is provided for in avoidance provisions, and it often tends to
be a highly controversial issue, is whether elements that have to be proved in order for
the avoidance of  a transaction are subjective or objective. If  avoidance can occur when
either certain facts and conditions are merely established, then the test provided for is
objective, but, if  avoidance will only be ordered if  it can be proved that the debtor or the
person who received a benefit from the debtor had some belief  or intention, then that is
subjective. Subjective tests are concerned with the state of  mind of  one or more parties
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while objective tests are concerned with objective facts. An example of  a test that is
objective is providing that a transaction must fall within a certain time period. This matter
can be established by events and accounts and there is no need to consider the beliefs or
intentions of  any parties. An example of  a subjective test is found in UK law where it
provides that a court order avoiding a preference will only be permitted if  the insolvent
is proved to have been influenced in deciding to give the preference by a desire to put the
beneficiary of  the preference in a better position.84 Many jurisdictions, such as the UK,
have a mixture of  objective and subjective tests in their array of  avoidance rules, but the
Netherlands only employs subjective tests.85
Clearly, both subjective and objective approaches have their shortcomings. It is not
possible to discuss these in depth, but the leading shortcomings for subjective tests are as
follows. First, it is frequently demanding on insolvency practitioners in many cases to be
required to establish that a subjective test is satisfied. It is often not easy to prove the
intention of  a person, and even more difficult to establish the intention of  a corporate
debtor. Second, ascertaining whether a subjective test has been satisfied or not in an
avoidance action is time-consuming; it can be a difficult issue for a court to deal with and
the outcome of  such proceedings is often uncertain,86 or at least more uncertain than
where there is no subjective test involved. The leading shortcomings of  objective tests
are: an objective test may precipitate uncertainty in that anyone dealing with a company
cannot be sure that the transaction will not be avoided at some later point even if  he or
she did not know of  the company’s financial problems or the company had no intention
of  favouring the beneficiary of  the transaction; and, if  the objective facts can be proved,
then the beneficiary of  the transaction is liable when he or she might not have been at
fault.87 This seems to be unfair, at least in some circumstances.
Bearing in mind that the general aim of  the avoidance rules is to protect the collective
scheme of  insolvency and that the creditors must have suffered a detriment from a
transaction,88 it makes more sense to provide, on the whole, for objective rules. To offset
the harshness of  such an approach defences could be provided for to enable a
defendant/beneficiary to extricate himself  or herself  from liability if  certain things can
be established.
If  it is felt that a subjective test has to operate, then what has to be decided is to which
party or parties is the test to be applied. Usually, it is applied to either the debtor or the
direct beneficiary of  the impugned transaction. It could be applied to both and require
that the test in relation to both parties had to be satisfied for an avoidance order, but that
is likely to make it exceedingly difficult for insolvency practitioners to establish a case and
get an order. There are different approaches across the EU as to whether the debtor or
beneficiary’s state of  mind is included in the avoidance rule. For instance, German law
provides89 that, in determining whether or not a preference can be avoided, one has to
consider the mind of  the creditor/beneficiary of  the preferential transfer, whereas in
England and Wales it is the insolvent debtor’s intention, and not the creditor’s, that is one
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of  the critical issues in being able to establish that a preference was given.90 It is
submitted that, if  there is to be a subjective test employed, and it might be more
appropriate for some rules, it would seem more sensible to make the subjectivity to be
that of  the beneficiary/creditor and not that of  the debtor.91 It does not seem fair that,
if  a beneficiary is blameless, as far as wanting a transaction to be detrimental to creditors
of  the debtor, he or she suffers a detriment, especially if  the transaction is avoided
because of  the desire or knowledge of  the debtor. There is a good argument for saying
that it is just and reasonable to require some form of  subjective test where the relevant
avoidance rule seeks to allow the challenging of  transactions that have been entered into
in an attempt to defraud creditors. The allegation of  fraud is a severe one and arguably
requires clear proof  of  subjective intent. However, if  one were to make the test
dependent on the beneficiary’s state of  mind alone then it would be necessary to include
a presumption (an issue that is discussed shortly) in relation to beneficiaries associated
with the debtor that they would be presumed to have had the requisite state of  mind for
avoidance, or else, in rules such as transactions at an undervalue, debtors and associated
parties might be able to conspire to ensure that the latter did not have the state of  mind
generally required. 
If  objective tests are to be implemented then there must be a time constraint placed
on the right to avoid, or else it will create a substantial amount of  uncertainty.92 For
preference claims, the Americans have a 90-day period prior to the opening of  insolvency
proceedings in which all transfers by the debtor to a creditor can be set aside, but there
is no defence at all to a preference claim provided that all of  the conditions of  a
preference can be satisfied. While in Australia the period in which a preference can be said
to have been given is six months, a fairly standard period in EU jurisdictions. In both the
US and Australia those creditors who receive preferences within the period mentioned are
able to invoke a defence. The next issue is whether a (and if  so what) defence is to be
made available to a beneficiary of  a transaction that is entered into during the period in
which a transaction might be set aside. A defence might involve some subjective element
and thereby rectify the balance that might be thought to be prejudicial for a beneficiary
who would be able to pass a subjective test. For example, a beneficiary’s defence might be
framed to permit the beneficiary to retain a benefit if  he or she did not know that the
debtor was insolvent at the time of  the transaction.93 As mentioned already, the
Australians do provide a defence to their objective test for preferences. In Australia a
court is not to make an order materially prejudicing a right or interest of  a person (the
beneficiary of  the transaction made with the debtor) if  all of  the following three
conditions can be fulfilled: the person became a party to the transaction in good faith and
at the time when the person became such a party the person had no reasonable grounds
for suspecting that the company was insolvent at that time or would become insolvent; a
reasonable person in the person’s circumstances would have had no such grounds for so
suspecting; the person has provided valuable consideration under the transaction or had
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changed position in reliance on the transaction.94 The US legislation allows for a defence
when a payment was made in the ordinary course of  business.95
The drawback for beneficiaries of  transactions wishing to defend an insolvency
practitioner’s claim is that, usually, they have the burden of  proving their subjective state
in order to satisfy the defence.
4.3 PRESUMPTIONS
Legislation in many member states specifies that some presumptions, most of  which are
rebuttable by the person against whom the avoidance action has been instituted, will be
applied in certain circumstances. The existence of  presumptions is an implicit
acknowledgment by legislators that insolvency practitioners would find it exceedingly
difficult to prove some conditions that are contained in avoidance rules if  they were not
helped by presumptions. It is recognition of  the fact that an insolvency practitioner
comes to an insolvent’s estate with very limited knowledge about the debtor’s affairs and
he or she can only obtain a restricted amount of  information, often because the directors
and other officers fail to co-operate. Also it might be an acknowledgment that certain
transactions are either potentially or inherently questionable and therefore it is warranted
that presumptions are applied. An example is a transfer of  property to a party related to
the company, such as a director.
A presumption that is included in some legislation is that, where it has to be
established that the defendant to the avoidance action knew or ought to have known of
the debtor’s insolvency when entering into the transaction with the debtor that is
impugned, the defendant’s knowledge is presumed. The defendant then has to rebut that
presumption. In constructing harmonised avoidance rules it will be necessary to consider
what matters should be presumed, to whom will the presumption apply and whether or
not it can be rebutted, and, if  so, how.
4.4 WHO CAN TAKE ACTION?
It is of  course a critical matter that there is some provision somewhere that identifies the
one who is entitled to take action for the avoidance of  a transaction. As INSOL Europe
noted in its report on harmonisation of  EU law on insolvency, different positions exist
in member states as to who is entitled to initiate proceedings.96 The candidates are the
insolvency practitioner (perhaps needing court or creditor approval in some cases), a
government official, a court supervisor and possibly a creditor. Certainly, the insolvency
practitioner is the most frequent claimant in an avoidance action in and outside of  the
EU. A creditor might be only able to bring proceedings on some occasions after securing
the approval of  one of  the following: the insolvency practitioner, the court or some other
independent body. It would seem to be unwise to permit creditors to bring proceedings
without obtaining permission as the institution of  avoidance actions would ordinarily be
part of  the role of  the insolvency practitioner, and a creditor should have to establish a
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good reason why he or she believes that proceedings should be instituted when the
insolvency practitioner did not do so.
In a Note, titled ‘Harmonisation of  Insolvency Law at EU Level: Avoidance Actions
and Rules on Contract,’ the European Parliament’s Policy Section felt that harmonisation
in respect of  this issue was going too far and trespassing on the national domain,97 and
thus it was viewed to be a matter for nation states as to who might be entitled to bring
proceedings. This seems to be understandable and, whoever is entitled to bring
proceedings, he or she will be bound by the harmonised scheme.
4.5 VALUE
It is a critical aspect of  provisions that allow for the challenging of  transactions at an
undervalue and, to an extent, transactions that defraud creditors that it be established that
the insolvent debtor did not receive as much consideration in money terms from the
transaction as the other party to it. Hence, how one provides for the valuation of  the
consideration is an important element. Luxembourg,98 Malta99 and the UK100 include in
their provisions dealing with transactions at an undervalue that the insolvency practitioner
is obliged to prove that what the debtor received was, in money terms, significantly less
than what the debtor gave to the other party. No definition or guidance is provided in the
legislation and determining whether there was significant undervalue is left squarely
within the discretion of  the court. Other jurisdictions include reference to value in broad
terms. The Hungarian legislation provides that there is avoidance where there is
conspicuous undervalue in bilateral transactions.101 This, like the provisions in
Luxembourg et al, suffers from vagueness. Other member states do refer to the
unevenness of  consideration passing between the parties to a transaction. For instance,
the Polish legislation refers to disproportionately low consideration being received by the
debtor.102 The legislation of  many member states does not refer to unevenness of  value,
but merely provides that a transaction is voidable where it is detrimental to the creditors.
Unevenness of  value would be an indicator of  detriment. Possibly, merely stating that a
transaction can be avoided if  it is detrimental to the creditors is preferable to stating the
kind of  undervalue that there must be, for it is less vague than the latter approach.
4.6 THE SUSPECT PERIOD
For the most part avoidance provisions specify a period of  time in which a transaction
must have been entered into for it to be subject to successful challenge. This is to ensure
a degree of  certainty and to protect contract finality.103 Most member states provide a
number of  time zones for different avoidance rules, although Spain, because it effectively
has only one avoidance rule, has one time period applicable to all transactions that might
be avoidable. Different periods are specified for the avoidance of  different transactions
under the law of  the various member states. The periods can be quite diverse, and a
number of  them might be used in any one jurisdiction’s avoidance rules. The avoidance
of  security interests particularly provides an instance of  divergence. For instance,
Germany’s s 130 of  its 1994 Insolvency Code provides that security can be contested if
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it was created within three months of  the opening of  insolvency proceedings if  the
debtor was illiquid at the time of  the transaction and the creditor knew of  the debtor’s
illiquid state. Yet, in the UK the time period for the invalidation of  some floating charges
is where the charge was entered into in the 12 months before the commencement of
liquidation or administration, but this is extended to two years if  the creditor in whose
favour the charge is granted is a connected party.104
The longest suspect periods tend to be reserved for transactions that involve
fraudulent intent on the part of  the debtor. For instance, there is no time limit prescribed
for transactions to defraud creditors in the UK.105 The provision of  a long time zone
does, as with presumptions, help insolvency practitioners who are seeking to avoid an
antecedent transaction. Transactions at an undervalue are often next in the length of  the
suspect period. For instance, in Germany the time period is four years. The shortest
suspect period tends to be applied to preferences. Several jurisdictions provide that only
transactions entered into during the period of  three months before the commencement
of  insolvency proceedings can be avoided,106 while a substantial number of  other
jurisdictions employ a period of  six months.107 One justification for a shorter period for
preferences compared with undervalue transactions is probably that the former do not
reduce the net estate for distribution while the latter do.
4.7 CALCULATING THE SUSPECT PERIOD
Where time periods are established, it is important to know from what point one goes
back in time to ascertain whether transactions are able to be avoided. The point is usually
the time when insolvency proceedings are opened. What opening means can be different
in each member state, and that caused some problems in the application of  the EIR
before its recast. This is a matter that would need to be considered very carefully as
potentially it could be of  critical importance.
4.8 ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE INSOLVENT AND THE COUNTER-PARTY
(CONNECTED PERSONS)
Some avoidance laws might only apply where the insolvent and the person or company
with whom it makes the transaction are connected in some way. Alternatively, avoidance
rules might apply equally to parties connected and unconnected to the insolvent, but the
time in which the rule applies might be somewhat different. For example in the UK a
preferential transfer can only be challenged when it is entered into within six months
before the commencement of  insolvency proceedings,108 whereas that period extends to
two years where the recipient of  the preference is connected to the insolvent.109
Furthermore, the existence of  a connected party in a transaction might provide an
insolvency practitioner with the benefit of  a presumption in some respects. An example
is where the beneficiary of  the transaction has to be proved to have been aware of  the
debtor’s insolvency when the transaction was entered into; this is presumed if  the
beneficiary is a connected person.
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The reason why a longer suspect period is usually provided for where there is a
connected party involved in a transaction is that a connected party might either directly
or indirectly cause the business of  the debtor to continue for a term before it enters
insolvency proceedings so that any transaction entered into falls outside of  the suspect
period that is provided for in the avoidance rules. Also, a connected person could either
influence the directors of  the company in the decisions they make, particularly as to
whether the company enters insolvency proceedings, or they can even manipulate
company decisions.
At present, all member states make provision for connected persons save for
France,110 Malta and Luxembourg.111
If  special provision were made for transactions that involve connected persons, and
one would assume that legislation would do so given the fact that nearly all EU states
currently make such provision, it has to be decided who is to be included within the
category of  connected person. This is not easily resolved. Usually, the following are
included: relatives of  an individual insolvent; directors and shareholders of  an insolvent
company; companies in the same corporate group as an insolvent company; and relatives
of  directors.112 But the various member states provide different definitions of  persons
who are connected. The Netherlands is particularly broad and includes foster children of
a director of  the debtor company.113 Other states that provide a fairly comprehensive list
of  connected persons are Poland and Spain,114 while others provide for a limited
provision. An example is Italy where only spouses are seen as associated persons. 
4.9 THE AVOIDANCE OF TRANSACTIONS PECULIAR TO ONE OR FEW JURISDICTIONS
A major issue that has to be considered is what approach is to be taken in relation to the
avoidance of  transactions that might be provided for in only one or two jurisdictions. The
relevant provisions are notable as there is nothing or little to which they can be compared
and they owe their existence to considerations that are often special to the particular
member state. What is likely is that a matter that is covered by an avoidance rule in one
member state might be dealt with in another state by provisions in non-insolvency
legislation. An example of  a provision that is peculiar to one state is the UK’s provision
for the avoidance of  extortionate loans.115 Such transactions, or at least similar
transactions, might be avoidable under consumer legislation or other civil law provisions
in other member states. 
It is obviously not possible for a harmonised set of  avoidance rules, unless they are
going to be overly long and complicated, to be able to encompass all of  the rules that
are peculiar to one or even a few jurisdictions. If  a scheme were to do this it would be
too complex. Provisions that presently exist in member states could be considered and
evaluated as to whether they might be broadened and included in harmonised rules. If
not, then national governments might consider moving the provision into some other
piece of  national legislation. Another option would be to permit states to add local rules
on to a harmonised set of  rules, provided that they do not clash or overlap with the
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former. The drawback with this latter option is that it would not foster certainty. It
would also mean that practitioners would not be conversant with, potentially, many
different rules across the EU, which is one concern that has been voiced about the
present state of  affairs.116
4.10 ORDERS
Obviously, on most occasions it is the order of  a court with which an insolvency
practitioner is most concerned. Even where an avoidance rule renders a transaction void
automatically, as some rules do, a court order might be needed to support the voiding of
the transaction. For example, an order might be needed to force a party to pay money or
return property to the estate of  the insolvent. What is actually ordered can be critical.
What the EC must consider, if  deciding to embark on harmonisation, is whether the rules
formulated will include specific directions as to what orders might be made, or whether
the nature of  the orders are left entirely within the discretion of  the court hearing the
matter. There are advantages and disadvantages with either approach. The advantage of
provisions that specify exactly what a court can order if  the claimant makes out his or her
case is that the claimant knows what he or she will get if  the case is successful. The
disadvantage with it is that, while a judge might find creative ways of  providing what he
or she thinks is just, the judge’s hands are tied to a large degree. The advantage with
providing courts with wide discretion is that it enables courts to tailor their orders to do
justice to the case, which might even include providing some allowances for the
defendant, such as where the defendant has improved property which he or she received
from the debtor and which has to be returned to the insolvent through the insolvency
practitioner appointed because of  the voiding of  the transaction.
4.11 TIME BARS
There is provision in the legislation of  most, if  not all, member states providing that, as
far as most avoidance rules are concerned, proceedings in the courts for an order of
avoidance or a related order must be commenced within a specified time period or else
the right to bring proceedings is lost. The importance of  time bars or limitation periods
is exemplified by the decision of  the CJEU in Lutz v Bauerle.117 In this case an insolvency
practitioner of  a German company against which insolvency proceedings had been
commenced in Germany could not recover certain funds pursuant to a German
avoidance rule that had been paid from the insolvent company’s Austrian bank to the
beneficiary in Austria. The reason was that under Austrian law, although not under
German law, the time for bringing proceedings had elapsed. The CJEU said that the
Austrian law took precedence because of  Article 16 of  the EIR.118
The limitation period varies in member states. It is two years in Poland,119 three years
in Germany, the Netherlands and Italy, and in the UK it depends on the type of  claim
that is made and is either six or 12 years.120 The harmonisation of  a period of  time,
which may involve a different period for each kind of  avoidance rule, might conceivably
not be a major obstacle to harmonisation. But the greater problem is that the point from
which time runs differs across the EU. In Croatia, Germany and Italy it begins from the
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point when the insolvency proceedings are opened.121 In the UK time runs from the
date on which the cause of  action accrued, which will normally be the date of  the
appointment of  the insolvency practitioner. In other states, such as Poland and Portugal,
it is from the date of  the declaration of  bankruptcy, and elsewhere it will begin from the
time when the insolvency practitioner becomes aware of  the relevant facts that indicate
a transaction can be avoided.122 This is the case in Greece, for instance, where the
insolvency practitioner has one year to bring the proceedings.123 Even if  a common
starting point were prescribed, such as the opening of  insolvency proceedings, this is
different in member states, and it is not always clear what is the opening of
proceedings.124 Perhaps one possible solution is to nominate the appointment of  an
insolvency practitioner as the commencement of  the time period and then provide a
particular time running from that point. 
Unfortunately, while the issue of  time bars might be seen as procedural, it is
something that cannot really be left to national states, because it can have, as Lutz v
Bauerle125 demonstrates, a major impact on whether avoidance rules are able to be
enforced, and if  each member state were to retain its own limitation period for avoidance
rules it would defeat the need for certainty, one of  the prime reasons behind
harmonisation. It would make it more difficult for insolvency practitioners to know what
time they have to work to, and a full knowledge of  the limitations in 27 (excluding
Denmark) states is unreasonable. Also, divergence on the actual periods could be seen as
producing inequality and unfairness.
In weighing up the inclusion of  a limitation period considerable thought would have
to go into whether a period on the short side were proposed or whether a long period
was appropriate. The danger with short limitation periods is that they places a significant
burden on insolvency practitioners to determine whether transactions might be
potentially avoidable, to seek legal advice, possibly obtain funding, and to gather the
necessary evidence. Yet the advantage is that they serve to focus the mind of  insolvency
practitioners on such actions early on in their administration. The concern is that, if  a
period is unreasonably short, insolvency practitioners will either not be able to come to
grips with the affairs of  the insolvent sufficiently to decide whether avoidable
transactions were entered into, and this is especially the case in relation to complex and
large insolvencies, or they will simply not bother to address the issue of  avoidance.
Another danger is that proceedings might be commenced prematurely without the
insolvency practitioner having really assessed the evidence. The consequence could be
that the estate of  the insolvent is vulnerable to the payment of  costs to the person against
whom proceedings were initiated and where the insolvency practitioner loses the case or
withdraws. The benefit of  long limitation periods is that it enables insolvency
practitioners to be meticulous in their investigations and evidence gathering, but the
potential drawback is that they can lead to procrastination or a lax approach in
ascertaining whether transactions might be attacked or actually initiating the proceedings.
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4.12 TRANSACTIONS RELATING TO RESTRUCTURING
When insolvent, a company might endeavour to engage in a restructuring process in order
to try and save it from liquidation. The EU, in line with many of  its member states, has
gauged that it is important to permit a company to have reasonable chances of  saving
itself  and reducing the losses of  stakeholders, such as creditors and employees. This
culminated in the EC’s publication of  a proposal in November 2016 for a Directive on
preventive restructuring frameworks.126 In engaging in the process of  restructuring a
company is going to run up debts and may seek and obtain new financing with the aim
of  enabling it to continue to operate and possibly develop. If  the company’s attempt fails
and it is placed in liquidation the avoidance rules will be considered by the insolvency
practitioner. Consideration needs to be given to whether a harmonised regime of
avoidance would entitle an insolvency practitioner to challenge transactions that were
entered into during an attempt to rescue the company from its financial malaise. 
In most member states, such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovakia and the UK, there is no special
protection presently provided in relation to transactions involving the provision of  new
finance or the giving of  credit on supply contracts, and avoidance rules will apply.127 So,
a repayment of  a loan during a restructuring process could be challenged as a preference
in many member states provided that the payment fell within the conditions formulated
for a preference. However, for the most part, any security that is granted in exchange for
new financing, and in order to support restructuring, will usually be safe from attack. In
this kind of  case, the financier is giving something new to the company and the company
is therefore benefiting; there is no ultimate detriment to the creditors. In some states the
protection of  security granted for new money is restricted somewhat. For instance, in
France, new financing cannot be challenged if  the lender supplied funds and it was in
relation to a settlement that had been approved of  by the court.128 The position in
Romania129 and Slovenia130 is similar. In somewhat of  a like manner, new financing
cannot be challenged in Greece, where no new financing arrangements can be attacked
subsequently provided that the new financing occurred during the execution of  a
restructuring plan.131 The proposed new Directive would protect new financing in that it
would not be declared void or voidable as an act detrimental to creditors in the context
of  subsequent insolvency procedures except where the transactions had been engaged in
fraudulently or in bad faith.132 There are incipient elements of  such an approach in the
rules that presently exist. For example, in Germany any transaction involving new
financing is deemed not to have been entered into with the intention of  harming creditors
if  it has been entered into pursuant to a serious effort to restructure.133
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5 Conclusion
In his report for UNCITRAL in relation to the harmonisation of  international trade law
in 1966, Clive Schmitthof  said that harmonisation would reduce conflicts and
divergences,134 and arguably a harmonised avoidance law would also do this for European
insolvencies, as well as overcoming many of  the concerns that exist with the present state
of  the law. But the devil is not only in the detail; it is also in constructing a schema for
harmonisation which involves identifying the leading issues that have to be considered.
The point was made at the outset that this paper’s purpose was not to endeavour to
formulate harmonised rules. That will need to be done and will probably involve a fair
degree of  pragmatism, as obtaining a perfect scheme is impossible. What the paper has
sought to do is to identify those factors that are important parts of  avoidance rules across
the EU and which will need to be considered by the EC in any attempt to harmonise.
There will be some hard decisions to be made and not all of  them might be seen as
producing fairness. The problem is that we can try as hard as we are able, but not all
aspects of  insolvency law and practice will lead to fairness. The fact is that the advent of
insolvency is such that some, if  not all, will be disadvantaged to some extent. That is the
nature of  the insolvency event.
A recent study has found that all member states have avoidance rules in their
insolvency legislation.135 The study has also found that all states, or at least a vast
majority, have some form of  avoidance rule in respect of  four kinds of  transactions:
preferences, transactions at an undervalue, transactions defrauding creditors, and
transactions granting security in certain circumstances. It is likely that any harmonised
rules will cover these kinds of  transactions. However, deciding on the kinds of
transactions that will be legislated for is only part of  the task. The way that the rules
address the issues canvassed in this paper is a critical matter. The EC will have to decide
which factors are dealt with in a harmonised scheme and what are left to individual states.
The more that is left to individual nations to address, the more likely it is that there will
be residual divergence that could attenuate some of  the benefits of  having a harmonised
system of  rules.
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